译 | 阑夕

　　在惴惴不安的情绪中，被普遍认为埋下动荡引线的2016年即将过去，从殚见洽闻的学院教授到长袖善舞的老道政客，从选情倾覆的发达国家到扑朔迷离的战乱地带，再也不会有人怀疑，atv直播，基于均衡和稳定的惯性正在消失，就像得知所乘列车脱轨的焦急乘客，虽不见得祸在旦夕，却少不了面对不确定性的焦虑症。

　　这不再是可被允许的局部风险，而是世界秩序的失灵隐患，巨大机器产生故障的时候，没有任何一片齿轮能够幸免，尽快接受和承认坏的结果，然后重新调整经验储备，这是必须摆上议程的备选计划。

　　由塞缪尔·亨廷顿创办的《外交政策》刊发了这篇文章，我将它翻译了过来，希望你也可以同样从中受益。

　　以下，是中英双语版的全文：

　　It’s the Globalization, Stupid

　　这就是全球化，傻逼

　　Don’t blame low working-class wages or the financial crisis for the populist wave that produced Trump and Brexit. The data show the tide started decades ago.

　　不要再把特朗普当选和英国脱欧随意归咎给工薪阶层过低的时薪，或者是为民粹主义铺了路得金融危机。从数据上来看，引线已经早在几十年前就埋下了。

　　BY ROBERTO STEFAN FOA

　　The votes for Brexit in the United Kingdom and for Donald Trump in the United States have confounded foreign-policy commentators the world over. How could the world’s two great Anglo-Saxon democracies, for centuries the leaders and advocates of a global, rules-based international trade regime, now be leading a path toward isolationism and mercantilism?

　　英国的脱欧公投和美国的特朗普当选，两件事接踵而至，让全世界的国际政治分析员措手不及。世界上最伟大的两个盎格鲁-撒克逊国家，几个世纪以来全球的领导者，现代国际贸易制度的奠基者，怎么突然就走上了孤立主义和重商主义的道路？

　　In the aftermath of a shock, we tend to rationalize that it is a result of contingent factors, the absence of which would leave the world as we imagined it to be. Perhaps the relationship between Britain and the European Union was always contentious. Perhaps the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis left an unusually large pool of underemployed working-class voters, seeking to lash out against the establishment. A few years sooner, a few years later, and it would all be different.

　　在最初的震惊过后，我们倾向于把这一切归结于一系列偶然因素，那些也许最终会如我们所愿消失掉的偶然因素。也许英国和欧盟的关系会继续保持现状。也许2008年的金融危机导致的大批失业人士在选举里故意乱投票来显示对抗。也许几年后，一切又都会好转。

　　Yet public opinion data proves the earthquakes of Brexit and Trump are not simply the result of chance or bad timing. Instead, they are the outcome of deepening fissures in the long-running project of globalization. Over several decades, that project has produced significant shifts in public opinion around the world, including ascendant national pride, antipathy to migrants, and growing skepticism about the legitimacy and effectiveness of international institutions. Those were tremors warning of a revolt against globalization. It is a revolt that has already defined politics in countries as far apart as Russia, Venezuela, and the Philippines, and it has now reached the established democracies of the West in the form of Brexit and Trump.

　　然而公众舆论的数据显示，无论是英国脱欧还是特朗普当选都不是偶然的时运安排。相反，它们都是全球化项目长期运行之后导致的深刻裂痕。几十年来，全球化已经在全球范围内导致了很多公众舆论的重大变化，包括民族感上升、对移民的反感、对于国际机构合法性和有效性的质疑等等。这些动荡的民意一直在给全球化敲响警钟。它们甚至已经在俄罗斯、委内瑞拉、菲律宾等国家里促成了政治上的变革，而如今已经将影响力覆盖到了西方民主国家，从而形成了英国脱欧和特朗普上台这样的事件。

　　The resilience of national identity

　　民族认同感的反弹

　　First, one of the paradoxes of globalization has been that, as cross-border travel, migration, and trade have increased, attachment to national identity has not weakened, but instead grown stronger. Since 1981 the European and World Values Surveys have asked respondents whether they feel “very proud,” “quite proud,” “not very proud,” or “not at all proud” of their national identity (see chart below). That recent decades have seen an upsurge in national attachment in authoritarian regimes such as Russia or China is unsurprising, yet less noted is a return of national pride in societies that were once thought of “post-national,” such as Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands. This surge in national pride has been concurrent with the growth of “new right” political parties, such as the Sweden Democrats (SD), the Alternative for Germany (AfD), and the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands.