首先，全球化的悖论之一就是，随着国际间旅行、贸易、移民的增加，人们对于国家和民族的依附感却有增无减。自从1981年以来，欧洲世界观调查针对民族自豪感进行问卷调查，选项有「非常自豪」、「很自豪」、「不太自豪」、「不自豪」四个等级。近年来的结果显示，不仅仅是在专制政权国家类似俄罗斯、■■等地有着民族情感热潮，在类似德国、瑞典和荷兰这种后民族国家里也出现了民族自豪感的回归。激进的民族自豪感和「新右派」政党们相伴而生，例如瑞典民主党、德国选择党以及荷兰自由党。

　　National pride need not take the form of chauvinism or nationalism, and yet, these remain its inherent risks. Pride entails a need for recognition, and a feeling that one’s achievements or way of life are worthy of special value, promotion, and protection. A proud public is easier for political elites to manipulate by instrumentalizing external conflicts, or blaming scapegoats within: “take back control,” and “restore our country” are the universal slogans of populist parties and movements.

　　民族自豪感这种情绪不需要以沙文主义或者民族主义这种有着潜在威胁的面貌出现。这种情感只是一种认可和情绪，让人们感到自己独特的生活方式和成就是值得保护、促进的，有着某些特殊的价值。这种自豪感可以被精明的政治家们当做应对外敌的工具，直播，或者指向替罪羊的刀枪，「夺回控制权」或者「让国家恢复原貌」是民粹政党常用的口号和宣传攻势。

　　这张图体现了30多年来民族主义的市场扩张

　　Hostility toward immigrants

　　对移民的敌意

　　Second, as scholars such as Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have documented, over the past thirty years, Western societies have become more tolerant in a remarkable variety of ways, including toward homosexual marriage, abortion, divorce, and the use of soft drugs. And yet, while such “lifestyle tolerance” has risen markedly across Western countries, “identity tolerance” — tolerance of peoples with different ethnic or religious backgrounds — has moved in the opposite direction. In particular, hostile sentiment towards immigrants has increased steadily decade by decade since the 1980s.

　　第二，就像罗纳德·英格尔哈特和克里斯蒂·韦尔泽等学者说过的，过去三十年间西方社会以一种显著的方式变得更加宽容，包括在对待同性婚姻、堕胎、离婚、软性毒品等方面。然而在「生活方式宽容」的另一侧，人们对不同种族或者宗教所应抱持的「身份宽容」上，却走向了另一个方向。特别是20世纪80年代以来，对移民的敌意与日俱增。

　　事实上，在叙利亚引起的难民潮出现之前，美国和西欧的移民政策是趋于严厉的

　　The conjunction of rising lifestyle tolerance with growing intolerance of migrants may appear, at first, contradictory: Should tolerance not extend to all groups and minorities? Yet it has opened the space for a socially libertarian platform within the radical right, defining itself as the defender of a “national way of life” against newcomers who do not share the West’s liberal values. Pim Fortuyn, the openly homosexual Dutch politician who combined a flamboyant social liberalism with unabashed Islamophobia, was the first far-right politician to occupy this ideological space. Yet the same rhetorical strategy has become a cornerstone of Geert Wilders’s PVV in the Netherlands, of Israeli secular nationalists, of the big-tent National Front (FN) of Marine Le Pen, and Donald Trump’s libertarian supporters, such as Breitbart journalist Milo Yiannopoulos. If the true clash of civilizations between Islam and the West, as Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris suggested in these pages, is over social liberties, then the globalization of media and peoples has turned this clash from an international to a domestic one, and one that is reshaping the party systems of major Western democracies. That may be one reason why Western political systems are now following the precedent set by Israel in the early 2000s, in which the collapse of the cosmopolitan center-left in the form of the Labor Party ceded place to a resurgent secular ethnic nationalism led by Likud, Kadima, and Yisrael Beiteinu.